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June, 1951
THE OPEN END MORTAGE*
C. BLAKE HIESTER
of the Denver Bar
Nearly every American, at some time in his life, comes in
contact with a mortgage instrument, and nearly every attorney
is faced with the problem, at some time, of deciding on the priority
of a mortgage instrument over some other mortgage instrument
or some different type of lien. I am endeavoring in this article to
deal with some aspects of a mortgage instrument which is designed
to maintain a priority in time over other liens. The instrument
concerned is know generally as an "Open End Mortgage." The
Architectural Forum has defined an open end mortgage as a mort-
gage instrument which provides for additional advances at a later
date, such advances to be covered by the original instrument.
In Colorado we deal generally with deeds of trust, but for the
convenience of language the term mortgage in this article shall
include a deed of trust, the term mortgagor shall include a grantor
of a deed of trust, and the term mortgagee shall include a bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust.
The open end mortgage is generally desirable from the stand-
point of borrowers and of lenders. Frequently a mortgage secures
an indebtedness which is paid back in small payments spread over
a long period of time. If the mortgage is an open end one, the
mortgagor can maintain and improve his mortgaged property, fre-
quently his home, by borrowing further amounts from his original
lender which further amounts will be secured by his original mort-
gage. If the mortgage still has a period of several years to run,
the additional advance can be spread over the remaining years for
repayment, and the additional monthly amount to be repaid will be
relatively small. If these small payments are compared with the
average personal loan so often used for the purpose of repairing or
maintaining the home, or even with the FHA Title 1 loan which
must be repaid within a period of three years, the advantage of
the borrowing under the original open end mortgage can be readily
seen.
It is true that such maintenance or repairs can be made and
secured by a second mortgage, but the loan costs and higher interest
rate make this type of financing much less desirable from the bor-
rower's standpoint. The advantage of an open end mortgage to a
lender can be appreciated if we will consider that his mortgage
becomes increasingly valuable with the increase in the value of the
security. A house which is kept in good order is better security
than one which is allowed to deteriorate rapidly because its owner
cannot afford necessary or desirable maintenance and repairs.
* This is an amplified version of a talk given by Mr. Heister before The Law Club
of Denver on March 26, 1951.
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Having briefly pointed out the advantages of the open end
mortgage, I shall devote the rest of this article to a discussion of
the protection such a mortgage gives to a lender. We have already
seen that an open end mortgage provides for additional advances
at a later date, and it is the protection given these additional ad-
vances which concerns us. It becomes immediately necessary,
therefore, to distinguish between the different types of advances.
Generally speaking we can, for our purposes here, divide such
additional advances into two types: those which are optional and
those which are obligatory. The attempts of the courts to define
these two concepts have caused much confusion on this subject.
The courts have defined an optional advance in the following ways:
It is optional if: (1) the mortgagee is not obligated to make it, or
(2) he cannot make it without the request of the mortgagor, or (3)
he may at his pleasure decline to make it, and may do so without
taking the risk of subjecting himself to damages or loss. The third
of these definitions seems the best, for reasons which will be seen
later, and is gaining favor with the courts. The courts have gen-
erally defined an obligatory advance in one of two ways: (1) the
future advance is obligatory if the mortgagee has agreed abso-
lutely to make the advance, or (2) the mortgagee must make the
future advance in order to eliminate loss. The second of these
definitions seems the more reasonable and is gaining favor with
the courts.
THE PRIORITY OF FUTURE ADVANCES
From the standpoint of the number of jurisdictions deciding
the question there appears to be a majority and a minority doctrine
concerning the priority of future advances made under an open
end mortgage over intervening encumbrances. Since the recording
statutes of this state and of many states would resolve the question
of priority between liens one of which is not recorded, we shall
assume hereafter that all liens claiming priority have been re-
corded, and an intervening encumbrance means one that was
recorded prior to the making of an additional advance.
The rule laid down in most jurisdictions is that an advance,
though purely optional, made pursuant to a mortgage of which
subsequent parties had record or other sufficient notice is a lien
or charge superior to an encumbrance intervening between the
giving of the mortgage and the making of the advance, if the
mortgagee had no knowledge and no actual notice of the inter-
vening encumbrance. It is to be observed that such rule, where
actually applied, has usually been invoked to deny effect to mere
record notice of the intervening encumbrance without the suffi-
ciency of any other form of constructive notice having been at
issue.'
1 In support of this doctrine see the cases cited in 138 A-L.R. 579 et seq.
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The Colorado Supreme Court followed the reasoning of this
majority doctrine in deciding the case of Du Bois v. First National
Bank.2  That case was briefly the following: One Du Bois was
indebted to the First National Bank of Denver in the sum of about
$7,000. As collateral security therefore and for all advances
thereafter to be made to him by the bank he executed his promis-
sory note in the sum of $25,000 secured by a trust deed on real
estate. From time to time therafter Du Bois obtained further loans
from the bank and gave renewal notes for them on the earlier
indebtedness. Subsequent to the making of the note, Du Bois and
his wife were divorced, and in the divorce decree the wife -was
awarded one-third interest in the real estate. After this award to
the wife, the bank paid advances to Du Bois under the original
mortgage. Du Bois defaulted in payment and the bank secured
a decree of foreclosure on its deed of trust. The wife seeks to
have this foreclosure set aside as to her one-third interest in the
property. The court held for the bank and against the wife. In
answer to the wife's contention that the trust deed is not a security
upon her portion of the property for advances made by the bank
to her husband after the maturity of the collateral note, or after
she acquired her interest therein under the divorce decree, and that
the rendition of the decree and the recording of her deed, which
was made in pursuance thereof, operated as constructive notice to
the bank of her rights, the court said:
No question is made concerning the validity of the mortgage to
cover future advances, and it is now well settled that the mortgage
need not state on its face that such was its purpose. It may be silent
as to that feature or it may specify a fixed sum for which the security
is given, and advances within such limit are protected; the amount
as well as the purpose of the security being established by oral evi-
dence. The position of the bank is that until she gave to it actual
notice of the acquisition of her interest in the property it might con-
tinue to make advances to the mortgagor, even after maturity of the
mortgage notes, since the mortgage did not restrict the time within
which the advances were being made which would be protected by
the mortgage as to the entire property. The Trial Court apparently
adopted the view of the law entertained by plaintiffs and also found
as a fact that all advances which the bank made to Du Bois were
made before defendant gave notice of her rights. If such is the fact
it would seem from the authorities that such advances are within
the lien of the mortgage.
It cannot be said that this was the actual decision because the
court goes on to state that under the facts of this case that question
is not a live one because the foreclosure sale did not bring in
sufficient money to cover all the bank's advances. The case is fre-
quently cited, however, for the proposition quoted.
In a more recent Colorado case, Ferguson v. Mueller,3 under
facts similar to the above case in that the subsequent owners of
243 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908).
S1 1 5 Colo. 139, 169 P. 2d 610 (1946).
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property subject to a deed of trust were concerned, the court dis-
cusses the law of open end mortgages as follows: When a mortgage
in turn secures future advances, the sum named as the considera-
tion is of no importance, because as between the parties it will be
security for the money actually advanced upon it and for nothing
more. The court said that no question is made concerning the
validity of the mortgage to cover future advances, and it is now
well-settled that the mortgage need not state on its face that such
was its purpose. It may be silent as to that feature or it may
specify a fixed sum for which a security is given, and advances
within such limit are protected, the amount as well as the purpose
of the security being established by oral evidence. The court cites
Du Bois v. First National Bank, supra.
ACTUAL NOTICE REQUIRED, NOT JUST RECORDING
So we see that, according to the majority doctrine, actual
notice of the intervening encumbrance must be had by the mort-
gagee making future advances in order to subject his future ad-
vances to the priority of the intervening encumbrance. There is
much confusion as to what constitutes notice for this purpose, but
the cases do generally hold that the mere recording of the inter-
vening encumbrance does not constitute notice sufficient to subject
the future advance made under an open end mortgage to the inter-
vening encumbrance. The above cited and other Colorado cases
have held that the mere recording of the intervening encumbrance
is not notice to establish priority of an intervening encumbrance.
4
Some cases have held that actual notice necessary to establish pri-
ority of an intervening encumbrance over an optional advance must
be the personal contacting by the intervening encumbrancer of the
mortgagee seeking to make future advances.
According to the generally prevailing doctrine, advances made
under a recorded mortgage given to secure optional advances will
not be denied priority in lien merely because the intervening en-
cumbrancer could not have determined from the mortgage without
extraneous inquiry the true amount of the indebtedness or advances
secured thereby.5
The majority doctrine discussed above is further clarified and
enlarged upon in Jones on Mortgages as follows:
Generally the amount intended to be advanced need not be stated,
provided it can be otherwise ascertained by the description. But even
where limitation is necessary in order to constitute a continuing
security, which will not be affected by subsequent conveyances, a
recorded mortgage for an unlimited sum is notice to a subsequent
encumbrancer as to all sums advanced upon the mortgage before the
subsequent lien attaches. Moreover, the record of the subsequent
mortgage is no notice to such prior mortgagee, that any subsequent
See also 138 A.L.R. 585.
5Op. cit. at 582.
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lien has attached. A subsequent mortgagee can limit the credit that
may be safely given under the mortgage for future advances only by
giving the holder of it express notice of his lien, and a notice also that
he must make no future advances on the credit of that mortgage. The
mortgage will then stand as security for the real equitable claims of
the mortgagee, whether they existed at the date of the mortgage or
arose afterward, but prior to the receipt of such notice. If such
mortgagee is not under any obligation to make advances, and after
notice of a subsequent mortgage does make further advances, to the
extent of such advances the subsequent mortgagee has the right of
precedence. But if such mortgagee is under obligation to make the
advances, he is entitled to the security, whatever may be the en-
cumbrances subsequently made upon the property, and whether he
has notice of them or not.
Citing the proposition generally, again, Jones on Mortgages
says the following:6
In this country, mortgages made in good faith for the purpose
of securing future debts have generally been sustained, both in
the early and in the recent cases. Such a mortgage is valid even as
against creditors and subsequent purchasers. It does not matter
that the future advances are to be made to a third person, or for his
benefit at the request of a mortgagor. Neither is the validity of a
mortgage to secure future advances affected by the fact that the
advances are to be made in materials for building instead of money.
A mortgage is not fraudulent because it is given for a larger amount
than the actual loan made at the time, with a view to its covering
future loans up to the amount of the mortgage. Nor is the creation
of subsequent valid indebtedness a fraudulent act, regardess of motive,
if the mortgage secures future advances.
In contrast with this majority doctrine, the doctrine of a few
cases (most of them not recently decided) provides that the lien
of a so-called optional advance made without actual notice of an en-
cumbrance intervening between the giving of the mortgage and the
making of the advance, is subordinate to such encumbrance, except,
of course, as a failure to record the intervening encumbrance may
have produced a contrary result. The substance of this doctrine is
that, for priority purposes, the optional advance is to be treated
as a new mortgage taken as of the time of the advance.
PRIORITY OF OBLIGATORY ADVANCE
We have discussed thus far the priority of additional optional
advances. Today's expanded building programs and large scale
building projects make for many of us the problem of the obliga-
tory advance even more acute, particularly where it applies to
construction money paid out under the security of an original
mortgage where the lender advances sums of money as the building
progresses. If under the terms of the original mortgage, the
lender has to advance sums to pay for work and materials during
the progress of the building, he is operating under an open end
mortgage which provides for obligatory future advances. Jones
6 Section 448.
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on Mortgages, Sec. 454 states the general law with regard to a
mortgage for obligatory advances as follows:
A mortgage for obligatory advances is a lien from its execution.
If, by the terms of the mortgage, an obligation is imposed upon the
mortgagee to make the advances, the mortgage will remain security
for all the advances he is required to make, although other encum-
brances may be put upon the property before they are made, and he
has knowledge of such encumbrances.
The effect and extent of the above doctrine is brought out in
Tillinghast v. North End Savings Bank.7 That case was, briefly,
the following: Upon a first mortgage to secure a building loan of
$20,000, a bank advanced $15,000 and retained $5,000, under an
agreement with the mortgagor that the latter sum should not be
paid "until the said building shall be in such progress to comple-
tion that the mortgagee shall deem it safe to advance said balance."
A second mortgagee acquired the equity in the property by fore-
closure, and brought a bill to redeem it from the first mortgage.
The bank had paid out the whole of the $5,000 retained by it upon
orders from the mortgagor, leaving the amount of $450 due to it
for interest. It was contended by the second mortgagee that the
bank ought to have applied the amount of $450 to the payment
of this interest from the $5,000 retained by it, and could not
require that sum to be paid by the second mortgagee in redeeming
from the bank's mortgage. It was held that the bank could not
be compelled to make such set-off.
OBLIGATORY ADVANCES V. MECHANICS' LIENS
The application of the doctrine stated above concerning the
priority of future obligatory advances becomes important espe-
cially, in many cases, when confronted with the priority of the
mechanics' lien laws. A mortgage for future advances has, in
cases where the making of such advances was apparently obliga-
tory, been held to be a prior mortgage and the mortgagee to be a
prior bona fide mortgagee, and its lien has been held not to be one
attaching or originating subsequently to the commencement of the
work, within the meaning of the provisions of mechanics' lien laws
fixing the relative priority of such liens and other encumbrances
on the property. The right of a mortgagee for future advances
to priority over mechanics' liens for advances made during the
progress of the work is sometimes a matter of balancing conflicting
equities. When the mortgage money is to be advanced and used
for the carrying on of the work, and the lien claimants have
furnished labor or materials with actual or constructive notice
thereof, the mortgagee is ordinarily deemed entitled to priority.
A Colorado case is enlightening on this matter. The case of
Joralmon v. McPhee s was, briefly, the following: A Mrs. Snell
7178 Mass. 458, 459, 59 N.E. 1016 (1901).
831 Colo. 26, 71 P. 419 (1903).
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owned land subject to two mortgages, the second of which was for
the benefit of Mrs. O'Donnell. Mrs. Snell wanted to have improve-
ments erected on the land and contracted with two gentlemen
named Tooker and Joralmon to perform this work. Mrs. O'Donnell
agreed to allow Joralmon and Tooker to have deeds of trust prior
to hers on the condition that the money loaned by Tooker and by
Joralmon would be used first to pay off the first mortgage and
second to pay for the improvements to be erected on the land. All
parties having agreed to this, Mrs. O'Donnell released her deed
of trust. Mrs. Snell then signed promissory notes to Tooker, an-
other to Joralmon and a third to Mrs. O'Donnell. Deeds of trust
were executed and recorded in that priority. The money advanced
by Tooker and Joralmon was used partly to pay off the first en-
cumbrance as agreed upon and $2,770.10 was used to pay for the
construction of improvements on the property. The improvements
were not completed and and contractors, laborers, and material-
men filed mechanics' liens which they were seeking to have fore-
closed. The main question raised, in which we are interested, is
that of the priority of the various liens. As to the funds which
had been loaned prior to the commencement of the building and
which was secured by deeds of trust on record prior to the com-
mencement of the building, the court stated that any mechanics'
liens were obviously second to such mortgages to that extent. The
real question with which we are concerned, is this, therefore, part
of the money advanced by Joralmon and Tooker was advanced
subsequent to the commencement of the building and the furnish-
ing of materials. The court held that to the extent of the money
secured by these mortgages, which was actually extended for the
construction of the improvements, the mortgages of Tooker and
Joralmon were prior to the mechanics' liens. In holding this the
court said:
Where mechanics and material-men have notice of the existence
of a mortgage, which is given expressly for the purpose of securing
funds to construct an improvement and to know that the funds thus
obtained are being applied in that way, their rights must be held
subordinate to that of the mortgagee to the extent of such advances
because of this knowledge. In other words, when they know that a
structure upon which they are engaged has been pledged as security
for advances to be applied toward its construction by a contract
entered into before the work of erection was commenced they are
bound by such an arrangement up to the extent that funds under such
contract are actually advanced and applied to construct the building.
So, where the advances are all made before the work is done, or
material furnished the equity of the mortgagee is superior to that of
the lien claimant.
After having determined generally what the law is with re-
spect to the priority of the lien of a mortgage for future advances
it becomes important to know what amounts to a mortgage for
future advances. Obviously a mortgage instrument which de-
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scribes, in clear language, that it secures a specifically mentioned
indebtedness plus additional advances of certain amounts or up to
a certain amount is such a mortgage. As to those mortgages which
are not absolutely clear I can but cite examples of some which
were adjudicated to be mortgages for future advances and those
which were adjudicated not to be and let the reader decide for
himself how best to word such a mortgage.0
CASES ON MORTGAGES FOR FUTURE ADVANCES
An Arkansas case decided that a mortgage which provides
that it shall be security for a debt of $100.00 to mature in the
future, "and all other indebtedness which may then be due" to the
mortgagee by the mortgagor will cover future advances."
A California case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
to secure "all moneys due or hereafter to become due" does not
relate merely to existing indebtedness, but secures future loans
and advances as well.
An Iowa case is cited for the proposition that a conditional
deed, containing a clause providing that the property shall be
reconveyed on the payment of the grantee of a "sum of money
equal to all claims and evidences of indebtedness that the grantee
shall have against" the grantor may be a mortgage for future
advances.
A Maine case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage pur-
porting to secure the repayment of a certain amount and "also all
other debts which the mortgagor may contract with the mortgagee"
will cover future advances.
A Michigan case is cited for the proposition that the fact that
a mortgage recites a stated consideration does not prevent it from
being a mortgage to cover future advances, where the mortgagor
covenants to repay such sum and also "any sum of money which
he may now or hereafter owe said mortgagee by reason of any
note, check, draft or other paper upon which his name shall appear,
either as maker or otherwise; and this mortgage and its accom-
panying note, until discharged, is to be a continuing security for
payment of any such sum or sums."
An Illinois case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
given to secure monthly installments of rents, to become due in
the future, is not one to secure future optional advances, although
the landlord, under the terms of the lease, was entitled to termi-
nate it upon non-payment of any installment of rent.
Another Maine case is cited for the fact that a bill of sale
given to one "as security for his liability upon certain notes" en-
dorsed by him, the amount of which is not given, does not cover
future liability by endorsement.
'The specific citations for the cases mentioned can be found in 1 A.L.R. 1586.
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A Minnesota case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
which recites that it is given as collateral security for the payment
of certain book accounts, "according to the terms of a certain
contract bearing even date herewith," which did not provide for
future advances to the mortgagor, cannot be treated as one for
future advances.
As a general rule, advances in excess of the amount of a
mortgage are not secured by it; however, it is stated that a limita-
tion in terms of the amount of the advances to be made may be
controlled by other expressions in the mortgage as to the purpose
of the advances; thus where the controlling purpose was to secure
advances sufficient to enable the mortgagor to raise a crop of cotton
advances beyond the sum specified were protected.
A wider understanding of the open end mortgage and the
protection it gives a lender might lead to better and easier home
development and maintenance, and might resolve many questions
concerning the relative safety of making advances under an ex-
isting mortgage.
SUPREME COURT ADOPTS AMENDMENTS TO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
On May 17, 1951, the Supreme Court of Colorado an-
nounced the approval of the amendments to the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure embodied in the reports of its
Rules Committee submitted on September 1, 1948 and Jan-
uary 4, 1950.
The effective date of the amendments will be August
18, 1951 and sometime prior thereto Dicta and the bar asso-
ciations hope to publish and have in your hands a copy of
these amendments.
Some 37 of the amendments were made to bring the
Colorado Rules into conformity with the 1947 changes to
the Federal Rules, two amendments were made to the Ap-
pendix of Forms for the same purpose, and eleven other
amendments were approved in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the committee.
The Rules Committee of the Supreme Court is com-
posed of Jean S. Breitenstein, chairman; Joseph G. Hodges,
V. H. Johnson, Thomas Keely, and Percy S. Morris.
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